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Rights in the Age of Identity Politics
Abstract

In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched in the Constitution at the height of what has
come to be known as an era of identity politics. The influence of identity politics on Canadian jurisprudence is
evident both in some of the specific rights entrenched in the Charter and in the manner these rights have been
interpreted. This paper examines two approaches to Charter interpretation that use the resources of identity
politics. On the identity approach, claims individuals and groups make about their identities in the course of
advancing rights claims are treated as immutable, non-negotiable facts, rather than as contingent attributes
grounded in their choices. The identity approach has been fruitfully used to trace discrimination and historical
injustice against groups. On the reasonable accommodation approach, courts determine whether specific
practices of ethnic and cultural minorities can be accommodated in particular contexts, such as schools or the
workplace, without imposing undue hardship on the providers of education or employment. Reasonable
accommodation can effectively call into question seemingly neutral rules and standards and expose their
biases against minority groups. Although both of these approaches have merits, they also carry risks for
minorities. To address these risks, institutions should adopt policies that both encourage “institutional
humility” and create viable democratic spaces for minorities to participate in the processes in which the
representation and assessment of their identities are at issue.
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Rights in the Age of Identity Politics
AVIGAIL EISENBERG *
In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched in the Constitution at the height
of what has come to be known as an era of identity politics. The influence of identity politics
on Canadian jurisprudence is evident both in some of the specific rights entrenched in
the Charter and in the manner these rights have been interpreted. This paper examines
two approaches to Charter interpretation that use the resources of identity politics. On the
identity approach, claims individuals and groups make about their identities in the course
of advancing rights claims are treated as immutable, non-negotiable facts, rather than as
contingent attributes grounded in their choices. The identity approach has been fruitfully
used to trace discrimination and historical injustice against groups. On the reasonable
accommodation approach, courts determine whether specific practices of ethnic and cultural
minorities can be accommodated in particular contexts, such as schools or the workplace,
without imposing undue hardship on the providers of education or employment. Reasonable
accommodation can effectively call into question seemingly neutral rules and standards and
expose their biases against minority groups. Although both of these approaches have
merits, they also carry risks for minorities. To address these risks, institutions should
adopt policies that both encourage “institutional humility” and create viable democratic spaces
for minorities to participate in the processes in which the representation and assessment of
their identities are at issue.
En 1982, la Charte des droits et libertés a été enchâssée dans la Constitution à l’apogée
de ce que l’on pourrait appeler l’ère revendicatrice des groupes marginaux. L’influence
de ces revendications sur la jurisprudence canadienne apparaît tant dans certains droits
particuliers qui ont été enchâssés dans la Charte que dans la manière dont on a interprété ces
droits. Cet article examine deux approches permettant d’interpréter les droits de la Charte
qui procèdent des revendications des groupes marginaux. Selon l’approche identitaire, les
revendications des particuliers et des groupes fondées sur leur identité dans le but de faire
valoir leurs droits sont traitées comme des faits immuables et non négociables, plutôt que
comme attributs découlant de leurs choix. L’approche identitaire a été utilisée avec succès
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pour retracer la discrimination et l’injustice historique à l’encontre de certains groupes.
Selon l’approche des accommodements raisonnables, les tribunaux déterminent s’il est
possible d’accommoder certaines pratiques des minorités ethniques et culturelles dans des
contextes particuliers, notamment ceux de l’écoles ou du lieu de travail, sans imposer de
préjudice injustifié aux établissements scolaires ou aux employeurs. Les accommodements
raisonnables peuvent en effet remettre en question des règles et des normes apparemment
neutres et exposer les préjugés qu’elles véhiculent à l’encontre de groupes minoritaires.
Bien que ces approches aient chacune ses mérites, elles comportent également certains risques pour les minorités et il est essentiel que les institutions apprennent à mieux aborder
ces risques. Aborder ces risques signifie adopter des politiques qui à la fois favorisent l’«
humilité institutionnelle » et créent un espace démocratique viable pour permettre aux
minorités de participer aux processus dans lesquels la représentation et l’évaluation de leur
identité est en cause.
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WHILE RELIGIOUS CONFLICT is not new to democracies in the West, the last

three decades have witnessed an increase in such conflicts and an intensification
of struggles between minority groups and the state. During this time a diverse
array of groups has become mobilized and politicized on the basis of features of
identity such as gender, race, language, ethnicity, indigeneity, religion, disability,
and sexuality, and they have made claims for protection or accommodation of
their identity before national and international courts. Although there is nothing
new about political struggles in which groups contest their status or demand
that the state recognize some aspect of their identity, the last three decades
have witnessed an increase in such conflicts in the West and an intensification of
struggles between minority groups and the state. Indigenous peoples have mobilized
increasingly on the basis of Indigenous identity and have advanced claims at the
international and domestic levels to seek recognition of their distinctive cultures and to secure land and other resources needed to protect their ways of
life.1 Religious minorities have mobilized to contest the terms of their access to
1.

Studies that explore identity politics in the context of Indigenous struggles include: Courtney
Jung, The Moral Force of Indigenous Politics: Critical Liberalism and the Zapatistas (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating
the New International Politics of Diversity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Tim
Schouls, Shifting Boundaries: Aboriginal Identity, Pluralist Theory, and the Politics of Self-
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the benefits of citizenship by engaging in debates about the legal recognition
of religious arbitration, prohibitions on wearing headscarves and kirpans (Sikh
ceremonial knives), the censorship of blasphemous cartoons, and the criminalization of polygamy, to name just a few examples.2 In the context of some of
these struggles, minorities have argued that the protection and accommodation

2.

Government (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation
of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2000). See also Avigail Eisenberg, “Domestic and International Norms for Assessing
Indigenous Identity” in Avigail Eisenberg & Will Kymlicka, eds, Identity Politics in the
Public Realm: Bringing Institutions Back In (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), ch 6 at 137;
Juliet Hooker, “Indigenous Rights in Latin America: How to Classify Afro-Descendants?”
in ibid, ch 5 at 104; and Villia Jefremovas & Padmapani L Perez, “Defining Indigeneity:
Representation and the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 in the Philippines” in ibid,
ch 4 at 79.
On religious arbitration in Canada, see Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law:
Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario,
2004), online: <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd>; Anna C
Korteweg & Jennifer A Selby, eds, Debating Sharia: Islam, Gender Politics, and Family Law
Arbitration (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). Debates about prohibitions
on wearing headscarves are explored by Natasha Bakht, “Objection, Your Honour!
Accommodating Niqab-Wearing Women in Courtrooms” in Ralph Grillo et al, eds, Legal
Practice and Cultural Diversity (London, UK: Ashgate, 2009) at 115; John R Bowen, Why
the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007); Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007). See also R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, 290 CCC (3d) 404. This case dealt
with accommodation of veiling in the context of criminal trials. The kirpan controversy
in Quebec schools was central to the Report of the Bouchard-Taylor commission. See
Quebec, Commission de Consultation sur les Pratiques d’Accommodement Reliées aux
Différences Culturelles, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (Quebec City:
Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences,
2008) (Gérard Bouchard & Charles Taylor) at 33 [Building the Future], online: <http://
www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf>.
See also Multani v Marguerite-Bourgeoys (Commission scolaire), 2006 SCC 6, 1 SCR 256
[Multani]. For discussions of the Report and the Supreme Court decision see, JeanFrancois Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Religious Challenges to the Secularized Identity of an
Insecure Polity: A Tentative Sociology of Québec’s ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ Debate”
in Ralph Grillo et al, (ibid) at 151. The Danish Cartoon Affair is examined in Jytte
Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). See
also Cécile Laborde et al, “Review Symposium: The Danish Cartoon Controversy – The
Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Challenges of Multicultural Politics” (2011) 9:3
Perspectives on Politics 603. Debates about the criminalization of polygamy are explored
by Sarah Carter, The Importance of Being Monogamous: Marriage and Nation Building in
Western Canada to 1915 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2008) and, in a more
contemporary context, in Lori Beaman & Gillian Calder, eds, Polygamy’s Rights and Wrongs
(Vancouver: UBC Press [forthcoming in 2013]).
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of some aspect of their distinctive identity is a requirement of justice and a
means of realizing the democratic values of contemporary nation-states.
In Canada, the era of identity politics coincides with the entrenchment of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 (Charter). Since 1982, the Charter has extended
constitutional protection to legal and political rights, many of which relate to
features of individual and group identity. For instance, section 15 of the Charter
guarantees equality on the basis of several identity categories including sex, race,
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and disability; sections 16–22 recognize the
linguistic rights of French and English minorities; and section 27 requires rights to
be interpreted in a manner consistent with the multicultural nature of Canadian
society. Many Charter scholars were initially hopeful that a constitution sensitive
to these kinds of identity and group differences would promote an expansive
set of rights for vulnerable groups and would have a democratizing effect on
constitutionalism in Canada.4 Yet for judges and legislators, who must respond
to identity claims in the public sphere, the challenge has been to translate
the abstract values of multiculturalism and identity-based rights into practical
and applicable terms. The challenges of translating the Charter’s principles
into practice have proven especially difficult in cases that invoke identity-based
claims. A growing number of legal and political scholars see identity politics as
generating group-based claims to non-rational, non-negotiable attachments that
can distort the protection of rights and freedoms and worsen the position of
minorities whom these claims are meant to help.5 Whereas some scholars remain
3.
4.

5.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B of the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
The Charter initially generated several critical assessments as well, beginning with Keith
Banting & Richard Simeon, eds, And No One Cheered (Agincourt, Ont: Methuen, 1983);
Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto:
Wall & Thompson, 1989); Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). These works all quickly became basic reading
for scholars interested in Charter politics. More optimistic accounts of the Charter’s impact
on minority rights can be found in Alan C Cairns, Charter versus Federalism: The Dilemmas
of Constitutional Reform (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1992); and Gregory
Hein, “Interest Group Litigation and Canadian Democracy” (2000) 6:2 Choices 3.
On the non-negotiable and essentializing nature of identity claims in the context of legal and
political decision making, see Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007) at 48-53 [Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture]. On
the non-rational nature of identity claims and the risk that identity claims can undermine
democratic values, see Daniel Weinstock, “Is Identity a Danger to Democracy?” in Igor
Primoratz & Aleksandar Pavković, eds, Identity, Self-determination and Secession (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate, 2006) 15. For more on the risk that identity claims can undermine democratic
values, see Monique Deveaux, Gender and Justice in Multicultural Liberal States (Oxford:
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optimistic about the role that identity claims can play in challenging the sometimes
narrow, legalistic interpretations of Charter rights, the view of identity that is
generally reflected in the practice of law and in politics has provided political and
legal actors with reasons to hesitate before venturing down the path of identity
politics in advancing claims under the Charter.
In this article, I assess the risks and benefits of approaches to Charter rights
that employ the resources of identity politics. Two such approaches have been
defended as helpful and revealing ways of understanding and advancing the
fair treatment of minorities: 1) the “identity approach” and 2) “reasonable
accommodation.” The first section explains these approaches and shows that,
while they provide effective means to address legitimate claims to injustice, they
may also lead to serious risks for minority groups. The second section examines
whether these risks are surmountable, and the third section explores two policy
frameworks, which I label “institutional humility” and “democratic space,” that
can help minimize these risks. These two frameworks aim to increase the capacities
of public institutions to respond to the risks of identity politics by enhancing the
transparency and accountability of decision-making processes and by providing
opportunities for minorities to challenge hegemonic presumptions about appropriate responses to their identity claims.

I. TWO IDENTITY APPROACHES TO CHARTER RIGHTS
A. THE IDENTITY APPROACH

One benefit associated with identity politics is that the attachments people have
to ethnicity, religion, language, and so forth can track social exclusion and
institutional bias and thereby provide a way of exposing the injustices suffered by
particular groups to the scrutiny of judges and other agents of public institutions.
Identity-based attachments can point to rules and processes that are represented
as neutral but that have the effect of disadvantaging and marginalizing particular
minorities.6 The failure of states to recognize identity-based attachments can

6.

Oxford University Press, 2006) and Jeremy Waldron “Cultural Identity and Civic
Responsibility” in Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, eds, Citizenship in Diverse Societies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 155.
On the false neutrality of some legal and political norms for cultural minorities, see Kwame
Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) at
88-99; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995) at 108-15 [Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship]; David
Miller, “Liberalism, Equal Opportunities and Cultural Commitments” in Paul Kelly, ed,
Multiculturalism Reconsidered: ‘Culture and Equality’ and its Critics (Cambridge, UK: Polity
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entrench group disadvantage and is sometimes experienced as a form of disrespect
by group members.7 For these reasons, several political philosophers have been
sympathetic to at least some manifestations of identity politics and have argued
for approaches to legal and political decision making that enhance the just and
fair treatment of minorities through a sensitivity to identity claims.8
But several studies have also shown that, in real-world settings, identity
claims fall short of their emancipatory promise. For instance, legal scholarship
shows that courts have failed to assess identity claims fairly or in ways that
are helpful in revealing valid concerns about discrimination and disadvantage
towards particular groups.9 Sometimes this failure results from judges relying
too heavily on conservative notions about group identities that are already
entrenched in law and politics. Furthermore, legal processes rely too heavily on
the discretion of judges who are overwhelmingly members of the majority elite
and whose perspectives may reflect broader public stereotypes and misinformation
about minorities. Where these conservative attitudes are uncontested, the risk is
that legal reasoning that is sensitive to identity claims may be less sensitive to the
interests of dissenting and marginalized members of minority groups. The aim of
identity-based claims is to broaden the kind of arguments that can be advanced
by minorities and to require that public decision makers become more sensitive
to legitimate cultural and religious differences; however, the actual result may be

7.

8.

9.

Press, 2002) 45. More generally, see James Tully, Strange multiplicity: Constitutionalism in
an age of diversity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Charles Taylor,
“The Politics of Recognition” in Charles Taylor et al, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics
of Recognition, expanded ed by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)
(providing arguments critical of liberal and procedural neutrality).
On the relation between respect and identity politics, see David Copp “Social Unity and the
Identity of Persons” (2002) 10:4 J of Political Phil 365; Avigail Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity:
A Normative Guide to the Political and Legal Assessment of Identity Claims (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2009) 28-32 [Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity]; and Margaret Moore,
“Identity Claims and Identity Politics: A Limited Defence” in Primoratz & Pavković, supra
note 5, 27. See also Taylor, ibid at 41-43.
See e.g. Appiah, supra note 6; Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity, ibid; Amy Gutmann, Identity
in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Kymlicka, Multicultural
Citizenship, supra note 6; Taylor, supra note 6; Tully, supra note 6.
Studies focused on the shortcomings of courts in assessing identity claims include Richard
T Ford, Racial Culture: A Critique (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Pascale
Fournier, “The Ghettoisation of Difference in Canada: ‘Rape by Culture’ and the Danger of
a ‘Culture Defence’ in Criminal Law Trials” (2002) 29:1 Man LJ 81; Anne Phillips, “When
Culture Means Gender: Issues of Cultural Defense in the English Courts” (2003) 66 Mod L
Rev 510; Alison Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004); Leti Volpp, “Blaming Culture for Bad Behaviour” (2000) 12:1 Yale JL & Human 89.
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to deepen stereotypes about group identities and entrench hierarchies, such as
patriarchy, within groups that make such claims.10
The risk that judges or legislators will accept identity claims that distort a
group’s identity11 or define that identity in a manner that discriminates against
a subset of group members can be especially great when identity claims are
accepted by courts to be immutable, static, and non-negotiable facts about a
group and when these claims cannot be subject to appropriate critical assessment. This is the risk of what has recently been called an “identity approach” to
religious freedom in Canada. As Richard Moon describes,12 under the identity
approach to Charter rights developed by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC),
judges accept individual attachments to religious beliefs and practices as immutable; religious beliefs and attachments thereby become a basis upon which the
law may not discriminate. On Moon’s account, since the entrenchment of the
Charter, courts have changed their approach to religious freedom from one that
is sensitive to protecting individual choice to one that accepts religion as an established fact about the individual and prohibits discrimination on this basis.
When religious commitments are understood to be personal choices, the law’s
10. The entrenchment of elite hierarchies, including patriarchy, in the context of identity
politics is discussed by Deveaux, supra note 5; Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture,
supra note 5; Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s
Rights (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Sarah Song, Justice, Gender,
and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007);
Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression and the State” (2001) 112:1
Ethics 84. For a discussion of the interplay between the ideals and real-world manifestations
of identity politics, see Avigail Eisenberg & Will Kymlicka, “Bringing Institutions Back In:
How Public Institutions Assess Identity” in Avigail Eisenberg & Will Kymlicka, supra note 1,
ch 1 at 1.
11. Several scholars of Aboriginal rights in Canada worry that, beginning with R v Van der Peet,
the Court has reduced Aboriginal rights to claims for the protection of distinctive cultural
practices (such as fishing for salmon, harvesting trees to make furniture, hunting moose)
rather than broader claims for jurisdictional authority or self-determination: R v Van der Peet,
[1996] 2 SCR 507, 9 WWR 1. The “distinctive culture test” adopted by the Court in Van der
Peet has been criticized for imposing narrow and static understandings of Indigenous culture
that link the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights to the continued adherence
of communities to these distinctive practices. See Gordon Christie, “Aboriginal Rights,
Aboriginal Culture, and Protection” (1998) 36:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 447; John Borrows,
“Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster” (1997-98) 22 Am
Indian L Rev 37.
12. See “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem” (2005) 29 Sup
Ct L Rev (2d) 201; “Government Support for Religious Practice” in Richard Moon,
ed, Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 217 [Moon,
“Government Support”].
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aim is to protect individuals in choosing to follow their religious beliefs even if,
sometimes, individuals must absorb the costs of their choices. To use Moon’s
example, according to the choice approach, the Lord’s Day Act, which required
all businesses to close on Sunday until it was struck down in 1985,13 did not
violate religious freedom because it did not prohibit those who believe Saturday
or Friday to be the Sabbath from closing their businesses on these other days as
well, even though the choice to follow their religious commitments imposed
additional costs on them.14
In contrast to the choice approach, when religious commitments are treated as
matters of identity—that is, as immutable, static, involuntary, and non-negotiable—
they become features of a person that the law must respect in order to treat people
as equals.15 When religious commitments are viewed as expressions of one’s identity,
a law that privileges the practices of one religious group over others (such as a
law that requires businesses to close on Sundays) may violate religious freedom if
it exposes individuals to disrespect or disadvantage, or if it denies them dignity
as members of a particular group.16 As Moon puts it, if religious belief is part of
the individual’s identity, “then its unequal treatment may be experienced by the
individual as an interference with his dignity and as a failure to treat him and his
identity group with equal respect.”17
The benefit of what Moon calls an identity approach is that it can track
social exclusion and historical injustice towards minority groups18 in a way
that an approach focused on protecting individual choice cannot. In part, this is
because an identity approach treats identity as somewhat static and immutable
and thereby accepts as emblematic of identity a particular group practice, belief,
or commitment. The approach then uses that practice, belief, or commitment
to trace discrimination against the group to which the individual belongs. We
can see this connection being drawn between the restriction of a group practice
13. The Lord’s Day Act was struck down in R v Big M Drug Mart. See Lord’s Day Act, RSC 1970,
c L13; and R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M Drug Mart
cited to SCR].
14. Moon, “Government Support,” supra note 12 at 222-27. For a philosophical defense of
a choice-centred approach to cultural and religious diversity, see Brian Barry, Culture and
Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).
15. See also Waldron, supra note 5 and Weinstock, supra note 5.
16. Moon, “Government Support,” supra note 12 at 232.
17. Ibid.
18. Whereas Moon focuses on the claims of religious minorities, a shift to an identity approach
in legal and political advocacy by people with disabilities on the subject of Charter rights has
also been documented. See Lisa Vanhala, Making Rights a Reality?: Disability Rights Activists
and Legal Mobilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) ch 2 at 57.
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and damage to a group’s identity in numerous cases in which groups contest
legal restrictions on the grounds of religious freedom. For example, in a recent
reference case about the criminal prohibition of polygamy,19 the Fundamentalist
Latter Day Saints (FLDS) in Bountiful, British Columbia presented evidence
to show that the criminal prohibition of polygamy has been used historically
as a tool by the state to expose members of their community to disrespect and
discrimination. The FLDS community submitted historical, political, and
sociological evidence to show that the criminal law prohibiting polygamy was
initially designed to dissuade the break-off Mormon sect from immigrating to
Canada, and was then used to stigmatize, marginalize, and exclude the group
from the benefits of citizenship in Canada and the United States. Women in the
community stated in interviews that, even if they choose not to enter a polygamous
marriage, they feel stigmatized by the law—as do all the other members of their
community. On their view, the criminal prohibition exposes all members of the
community to disrespect by prohibiting a practice that is emblematic of the
group’s identity.20 Whereas the criminal prohibition impedes individuals in the
community from choosing to follow one of their religious commitments, the
injustice the community claims to experience is not simply a matter of having the
choices of their members restricted. The prohibition of polygamy today fits into
a group-based history of social exclusion and a narrative of persecution that is far
more profound to the group’s sense of dignity than what a snapshot assessment
of individual choice reveals.
So, whereas social exclusion and discrimination are considered unjust only
because they are experienced by individuals, an identity approach connects
individuals to groups through collective practices and, through these group
practices, to a history from which structural injustices embedded in histories
of exclusion can be exposed where they would otherwise be obscured by focusing on individuals here and now. On this view, consider the argument made by
some Muslims that the publication of cartoon depictions of Muhammed by Jyllands Posten in 2005 was unjust because it violated the religious sensibilities of
Muslim individuals that prohibit reproducing images of the prophet (let alone
profane ones).21 This rationale provides what several commentators considered to
19. Reference Re Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, 28 BCLR
(5th) 96.
20. Angela Campbell, “Bountiful Voices” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 183 at 221. Campbell
was one of the witnesses called during the reference case.
21. The cartoons were published by Jyllands Posten on 30 September 2005 and then reproduced
in dozens of newspapers, magazines, and websites worldwide. For scholarship that considers
Muslim perspectives on the cartoon affair, see Tariq Modood, “The Liberal Dilemma:
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be a weak case for the legal censorship of the cartoons because, after all, many
publications offend individual religious sensibilities, and those who are truly
offended can choose to avoid reading or seeing the offensive material.22 And yet,
a stronger case against publishing the cartoons might have been made on the
basis of group identity, claiming that publishing the cartoons is disrespectful to
Muslims and that free speech ought not to be exercised in ways that ignore (if not
ridicule) distinctively Muslim sensitivities.23 While the identity-based argument in
this case may not provide a rationale for legally prohibiting publication, it helps
to reveal a compelling moral reason, based on group identity, why the cartoons
ought not to be published. This moral reason clarifies that part of what is at stake
in this case is a collective experience; this collective element illuminates why the
publisher’s refusal to reflect on these factors marginalized some Muslims and was
experienced, collectively, as a form of disrespect.24 Even though injustice in this case
is said to exist only because of how individuals are affected by the publication of the
cartoons, the argument that an injustice has occurred rests in part on evidence
that shows a history of discrimination and disrespect in the West against Muslims
as a group.
These examples illustrate that, in many contexts, a policy or rule can be
considered unjust not only because it impairs an individual’s freedom to follow
a religious practice or value that is meaningful to her, but also because the

Integration or Vilification?” (2006) 44:5 Int’l Migration 4. Saba Mahmood also presents an
account of what is at stake morally and emotionally for a large number of Muslims in the
Danish cartoon controversy. See “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable
Divide?” (2009) 35:4 Critical Inquiry 836.
22. For different perspectives on the case, see the special issue of the International Migration
journal: Tariq Modood et al, “The Danish Cartoon Affair: Free Speech, Racism, Islamism
and Integration” (2006) 44:5 Int’l Migration 3.
23. Modood, supra note 21 at 4-7; Joseph H Carens, “Free Speech and Democratic Norms in the
Danish Cartoons Controversy” in Modood et al, ibid at 33-42.
24. The protection of free speech may, nevertheless, be justified even where such group-based
considerations are taken seriously. The point here is that, if a convincing case can be made for
restricting the cartoons on the basis of religious freedom, such a case requires an assessment
that goes beyond individual sensitivities and considers the significance and importance of the
religious beliefs and practices of Muslims that are subject to disrespect and discrimination
because of the cartoons. For two arguments that consider such a view, see Modood et al,
supra note 22; Mahmood, supra note 21. See also Geoffrey Brahm Levey & Tariq Modood
“Liberal Democracy, Multicultural Citizenship and the Danish Cartoon Affair” in Geoffrey
Brahm Levey & Tariq Modood, eds, Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 216 (arguing, correctly in my view,
that the cartoon affair is a dispute about how to interpret liberal values rather than only a
struggle between liberal and Muslim values).
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restriction targets a religious group and marginalizes its members by exposing
them to discrimination, disadvantage, and disrespect. Evidence about the
meaning and importance of the practice to the group helps to illuminate this
collective dimension, which can easily be overlooked by assessments that narrowly
focus on whether an individual believer was free to choose.
Yet at the same time as such an approach can illuminate group-based injustices,
it also carries various risks. One risk is that if an identity approach treats a group’s
identity as immutable, static, and non-negotiable, it can constrain individuals and
groups by tying them to static understandings of their identities and, in some
cases, by entrenching stereotypes about their identities or by deepening internal
hierarchies that are associated with defining a group’s identity in particular
ways. This can occur because of the conservatism or misinformation of those
outside the group, such as judges or legislators, or because of the manner in
which groups themselves present their claims. Because groups have a stake in
how they are defined by outsiders, they can exacerbate this risk by exaggerating
the importance of their practices or the unqualified unity and uniformity of the
group in the hopes that doing so will enhance their chances of winning legal
recognition and protection for some aspect of their identity.25 Either way, an
identity approach to rights carries the risk of one kind of essentialism, which is that
the state or group actors will reinforce stereotypes about a group or static boundaries
about who counts as a member (or a member in good standing) of the group in
the course of legally validating particular collective practices or commitments
as core and immutable features of a group’s identity.26

25. Some advocates of religious arbitration in Ontario stated that “Muslims place their spiritual
and social lives in dire peril because they are thus made to submit to that which is other
than what Allah has ordained.” Syed Mumtaz Ali, “The Review of the Ontario Civil Justice
System: The Reconstruction of the Canadian Constitution and The Case for Muslim
Personal/Family Law” (Toronto: Canadian Society of Muslims, 1994) at 1, online: <http://
muslimcanada.org/submission.pdf> (Submission to the Ontario Civil Justice Review Task
Force). Others viewed such statements as attempts to consolidate the Muslim community
by inflating the importance of particular practices and thereby marginalizing Muslims who
did not adhere to those practices. For scholarship that considers this dynamic, see Anver M
Emon, “Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence and Multicultural
Accommodation” in Korteweg & Selby, eds, supra note 2 at 192. For an anthropological
account of the problem of performativity or “self-essentialism” in the case of Indigenous
claims, see Elizabeth A Povinelli, “The State of Shame: Australian Multiculturalism and the
Crisis of Indigenous Citizenship” (1998) 24:2 Critical Inquiry 575.
26. For an elaboration of the risks of essentialism, see Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity, supra note 7
at 61-62 and ch 6.
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In addition to the risks of essentialism, identity-based claims can entrench the
power of particular elites or elite hierarchies within groups. Again, sometimes this risk
starts within groups—especially within vulnerable groups that are struggling against
assimilation and fragmentation. Sometimes, group elites will define a group’s
identity and resist attempts by some members to develop more fluid or hybrid
notions of membership, which may more accurately reflect the nature of people’s
social attachments, in order to shield the group from assimilative pressure. Feminist
scholarship on cultural rights points to numerous cases in which conservative
group elites successfully use legal norms to protect sexist practices and patriarchal
hierarchies—for instance, where elites seek legal recognition for religious rules of
membership because, they claim, these rules are central to the religious identity
of the group even though they disadvantage women.27 Religious practices that
control women can seem especially important to keeping the community stable
and preventing group fragmentation, which are important to protecting group
identity.28 So group leaders may present particular religious commitments as
central and integral to the group’s identity in order to define the group and unite
it in particular ways, thereby protecting a favoured understanding of the group’s
identity while also protecting the leadership positions of a group of elites.
In many of these cases, the risk of essentializing identity or entrenching
hierarchies that increase the vulnerable status of women or other members of a
group only arises if the group’s identity is defined in immutable and static ways.
Where a group’s identity is publicly recognized to be pluralistic, fluid, and hybrid
it is much more difficult for judges and other public decision makers outside
the group to endorse conservative, essentialized, or stereotypical understandings
about that identity; likewise, it is more difficult for elites within the group to
present the group’s identity as uniform and uncontested.29 Yet, sometimes, without
these more static understandings of who counts as a member of the group or what
27. Examples of practices that have been presented to courts as central to the cultural or religious
identity of a group, but which are also patriarchal, include dowry practices in South Africa,
the marrying out rule in Canada, polygamy, the get in Judaism, and shari’a law concerning
divorce in Islam. For discussion of these and other examples, see Deveaux, supra note 5;
Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, supra note 5; Shachar, supra note 10; Song,
supra note 10; Volpp, supra note 9. See also Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev,
eds, Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights, and Diversity (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
28. Shachar, ibid.
29. The Ontario debates about religious arbitration provide an illustration of the impact that
publicity can have on the ability of religious elites to define religious identity statically for
large groups. For an assessment of the identity politics in these debates, see Eisenberg, Reasons
of Identity, supra note 7 at 45-51.
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practices are central and integral to the group’s identity, courts are unable to track
the ways in which the group has been exposed to social exclusion or even to identify
stable conceptions of the group itself. In short, the identity approach presents a
dilemma insofar as it may have the effect both of providing public decision
makers with the means to trace social exclusion and unjust treatment, and of
essentializing groups and entrenching hierarchies, identities, and stereotypes.
B. THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF IDENTITY

Another criticism commonly leveled against identity politics is that it encourages
groups to advance claims in terms that, at best, promise minor adjustments of
accommodation in the public sphere and fail to address deeper social problems such
as racism, poverty, and dispossession. Identity politics is therefore sometimes
viewed as a way of co-opting minorities rather than of addressing serious
forms of injustice. States have been known to encourage groups to repackage
their claims as cultural claims in order to make them easier and “safer” to address;
but when groups respond to these incentives, they divert their resources from
political struggles more directly relevant to their interests in order to enjoy
at least some modicum of security and protection for their cultural or religious
identity. Minorities are sometimes offered symbolic recognition, or their
leaders are given token positions of power and prestige, while ongoing social
processes of discrimination and oppression continue unaddressed.30 In relation to
Canadian multiculturalism, several critics have similarly argued that, in practice,
multiculturalism is a form of window dressing that allows liberal states to present
themselves as tolerant and welcoming of minorities while doing little to address
the racism, unemployment, and poverty that adversely affect the lives of visible
minorities today.31
The problem associated with reasonable accommodation is that minorities will
be co-opted by legal processes that encourage them to advance identity claims as
a means to mount their struggles for justice. The requirement of reasonable
accommodation entered Canadian law in the mid-1980s through human
30. For further discussion of this “risk of co-optation,” see Eisenberg & Kymlicka, supra note 10
at 5.
31. See e.g. Yasmeen Abu-Laban & Christina Gabriel, Selling Diversity: Immigration,
Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview
Press, 2002); Hamani Bannerji, The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism,
Nationalism and Gender (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000); Gerald Kernerman,
Multicultural Nationalism: Civilizing Difference, Constituting Community (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2005); Sherene H Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and
Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
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rights cases about religious discrimination in the workplace.32 As a result of
these cases, employers are required to adapt workplace rules and practices so as
to accommodate the religious commitments of their employees within the limits
of what is reasonable and short of undue hardship. As Bruce Ryder explains the
principle, “Facially neutral rules that have adverse effects on the basis of creed
or religion are a violation of the right to religious equality unless the employer
has taken reasonable steps, up to the point of undue hardship, to accommodate
religious observance.”33 In 1999, the principle received an expansive interpretation
in Meiorin,34 a case about gender and fitness tests for firefighters, and Grismer,35
which concerned standards of visional impairment and driver’s tests. More
recently, the Court has reasserted a minimalist interpretation of reasonable
accommodation.36 In 2006, the principle of reasonable accommodation was
used in the Multani case, which dealt with whether Sikh students can be
prohibited from wearing their kirpans (ceremonial swords or daggers) when they
attend public schools.37 At the Supreme Court, the conflict was framed as one
32. See e.g. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpson Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 23 DLR
(4th) 321; Bhinder v CN, [1985] 2 SCR 561, 23 DLR (4th) 481 [Bhinder].
33. “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship” in Richard Moon, Law and
Religious Pluralism, supra note 12, 87.
34. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGEU, [1999] 3 SCR
3, 176 DLR (4th) 1 [Meiorin cited to SCR]. Here, the issue is whether a fitness test for
firefighters discriminates against women.
35. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of Human
Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868, 181 DLR (4th) 385 [Grismer cited to SCR]. Here, the issue
is whether a standard set for healthy vision unfairly discriminates against employees with
vision impairment who can nevertheless pass the driving and road safety test required by the
employer.
36. Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day & Yvonne Peters, Accommodation in the 21st Century (March
2012) at 42, online: Canadian Human Rights Commission <http://www.chrc-ccdp.
gc.ca/pdf/accommodation_eng.pdf> [Accommodation]. Brodsky, Day, and Peters trace the
jurisprudence on accommodation and discuss the slide back to a minimalist interpretation.
37. Multani, supra note 2. For discussions of this case, see Colleen Sheppard, “Inclusion,
Voice, and Process-Based Constitutionalism” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 547 at 568-73
and Sujit Choudhry, “Rights Adjudication in a Plurinational State: the Supreme Court
of Canada, Freedom of Religion, and the Politics of Reasonable Accommodation” (2013)
50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 575 at 602-05. Sheppard notes that, in contrast to the constitutional
law approach, an administrative law approach to the duty to accommodate (as Justices
Deschamps and Abella describe in their concurring opinion) requires both a process of
dialogue and reconciliation between the parties to a dispute and consideration of the specific
details of the circumstances of the case. Such an approach is part of a broader movement
to interpret constitutional rights in ways that emphasize process, negotiation, consultation,
and entitlement to participate in democratic governance. Whereas resolving disputes such
as Multani through dialogue between the parties has significant benefits, Sheppard notes the
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about whether the school’s no-weapons policy could be adapted to accommodate
kirpans without causing undue hardship. The majority of the Court agreed that
it could. Accommodation was reasonable and could be managed with minimal
risk to school safety as long as kirpans were enclosed in a wooden sheath, which
was sewn inside a cloth envelope, which was in turn attached to a shoulder strap
worn under the student’s clothing.38 The Court emphasized that the principle of
accommodation helps in the realization of multicultural values by demonstrating
“the importance that our society attaches to protecting freedom of religion and
to showing respect for its minorities.”39 Then, in 2007, as a result of several
conflicts in Quebec about the kirpan and other minority practices, the provincial
government established the Commission on the Accommodation of Practices
Related to Cultural Differences, led by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor,
who were mandated to take stock of accommodation practices, consult extensively,
and formulate recommendations to ensure that current accommodation practices
conform to Quebec’s core values.40
In each of the foregoing contexts, the principal idea behind reasonable
accommodation is that treating individuals equally requires sensitivity to
their differences, including differences related to their identities. Reasonable
accommodation is a means of recognizing that norms and rules can unintentionally disadvantage minorities by reproducing worldviews and values specific to the
majority culture—worldviews and values that reflect the historical struggles of
majorities and sometimes of groups with which majorities have historically
interacted. Even if laws today do not exclude, a priori, any group or individual,
they can nonetheless lead to discrimination on the basis of specific features of
identity such as gender, religious belief, cultural practice, and physical disability.
It follows that strict application of legislation and regulations will not guarantee
fairness. In their report, Bouchard and Taylor explain that the appropriate measure
of fairness and equality is one that reconciles the rules with the differences among
people and thereby attempts to ensure that all people have equal access to the
public sphere, including to employment, housing, and public services, in full
light of their differences.41 So from the perspective of accommodation, the solution to seemingly neutral rules that can nonetheless disadvantage some groups

38.
39.
40.
41.

risk, also discussed here, that resolutions may be conservative in the sense that they will not
disrupt the status quo and may fall short of achieving substantive equality and inclusiveness.
Multani, supra note 2 at para 8.
Ibid at para 79.
Building the Future, supra note 2.
Ibid at 161.
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unintentionally is to adjust the rules to accommodate the difference. This means
that the aim of reasonable accommodation is not to abandon the rule but to
mitigate its discriminatory effects by making provision for an exception to the
rule or for a specific adaptation of it.
Yet, despite the proposed aim of accommodation being to adapt existing
rules and institutions in order to eliminate discrimination and inequality, this
framework can fall well short of embracing genuine equality. One reason for
this is that the reasonable accommodation framework has been interpreted
as endorsing the idea that majority rules are basically sound even though they
sometimes have to be altered in order to accommodate those whose practices are
outside the norm. The presumption that the law is sound can seem endemic to the
framework of accommodation and is facilitated by how reasonable accommodation
positions the law in relation to culture. The law is neutral, flexible, and adaptable to
cultural difference as long as those differences are reasonable. In this way, the law
stands apart from culture. As Benjamin Berger explains it, advocates of reasonable
accommodation envision that the law “sits in a managerial role” where it is used
to decide whether or not the state can remain indifferent to cultural difference.42
On Berger’s view, the law remains indifferent to cultural difference as long as
minority conduct is considered “reasonable” or not so different as to pose serious
challenges to “the organizing norms, commitments, practices and symbols of the
Canadian constitutional rule of law.”43 But in cases where the law cannot remain
indifferent, it must deem minority conduct intolerable and thereby unreasonable.
Either way, on Berger’s view, the law risks nothing of itself when confronted by
cultural difference. It positions itself above culture and, from this vantage, is
shielded from scrutiny as to whether it provides the basis for genuine equality.
When legal accommodation shields the law in the way that Berger suggests,
the framework appears to condone the failure of dominant groups to design laws
that are inclusive in meaningful ways and further disincentivizes genuine inclusion
by permitting passage of laws that exclusively reflect dominant interests as long
as dominant groups are willing to adapt these laws to those who are excluded.44
42. Benjamin L Berger, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21:2 Can JL & J 246 at
246-47.
43. Ibid at 259.
44. Meorin, supra note 34 at para 41. McLachlin J, as she then was, takes aim at this conservative
tendency in legal accommodation:
Although the practical result of the conventional analysis may be that individual claimants are
accommodated and the particular discriminatory effect they experience may be alleviated, the
larger import of the analysis cannot be ignored. It bars courts and tribunals from assessing the
legitimacy of the standard itself.
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The law is unlikely to reflect genuine equality when majorities have no incentive
to transform exclusive laws and when minorities, who are disadvantaged by the
law, are co-opted by the prospects of accommodation in the majority’s legal
framework. Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day explained in 1996 (in the context
of employment accommodation) that the accommodation framework prevents
majorities from confronting
the way institutions and relations must be changed in order to make them available,
accessible, meaningful and rewarding for the many diverse groups of which our society
is composed. … We make some concessions to those who are “different”, rather than
abandoning the idea of “normal” and working for genuine inclusiveness.45

Whereas the framework may be intended as a corrective for unjust, exclusive
laws, it often creates conditions that perpetuate exclusion by undermining the
incentives for minorities to demand truly inclusive laws and for majorities to
design inclusive laws.
Perhaps even more seriously, reasonable accommodation can further entrench
the power of dominant groups by requiring accommodation only to the degree
that it is reasonable and does not cause the majority undue hardship.46 In effect,
this means that the more fundamental a rule or norm is to the dominant group’s
way of doing things, the less likely accommodation will appear to be reasonable
even if it causes minorities serious disadvantage. The lessons that can be drawn from
actual cases of accommodation show, for instance, that the costs of accommodating
those who are unfairly excluded vary considerably depending on the degree to which
prevailing norms and governing rules have been exclusive of cultural, religious,
gendered, and other forms of difference. For instance, it is one thing to accommodate an employee who believes Friday to be a day of rest and wishes to be
absent from work on that day, and quite another for a business to accommodate
an employee who requires wheelchair access in an inaccessible workplace, or for a
business partnership to accommodate an employee who requires maternity leave
for an extended period of time. Whereas these examples are similar in that they
illustrate how the design of rules and institutions can impede the realization of
equality, they differ with regard to the degree of hardship they cause an employer,
and they illustrate that sometimes accommodation is expensive or requires a
fundamental transformation of existing arrangements because institutions and
45. Shelagh Day & Gwen Brodsky, “The Duty to Accommodate: Who Will Benefit?” (1996)
75:3 Can Bar Rev 433 at 462.
46. An approach that required comparing how much each side in a case about accommodation
had to adapt was suggested by Chief Justice Dickson in the context of Bhinder, but Dickson’s
approach was not adopted in the majority’s decision. See ibid at 439; Bhinder, supra note 32.
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rules have been so thoroughly designed in socially exclusionary ways. And yet
only if accommodation is interpreted in a way that draws into question disputed
standards, rather than merely assessing the hardship to mainstream groups, can
it possibly be used to dismantle discrimination and transform rather than tinker
with socially exclusionary rules. As Justice McLachlin (as she then was) wrote
in Meiorin, in the absence of legal interpretation that aims at transforming the
disputed standard:
The right to be free from discrimination is reduced to a question of whether the
‘mainstream’ can afford to confer proper treatment on those adversely affected, within
the confines of its existing formal standard. If it cannot, the edifice of systemic
discrimination receives the law’s approval. This cannot be right.47

With a view to justice, the presence of undue hardship can be a poor test of
whether accommodation is unreasonable and, instead, may indicate the degree
to which the dominant group’s position of power is written into the way that
social institutions work or are viewed as working well.48 The framework of
legal accommodation can thereby be interpreted in a manner that preserves
dominant norms.49
So whereas the aim of reasonable accommodation is to prevent social exclusion
by ensuring that minorities can participate in the public sphere fully and as equals,
without having to choose between their religious and cultural commitments and
where they work or choose to live, the practical effects of accommodation may
shield the status quo from deeper kinds of scrutiny that can reveal injustice and
bias built into the structural foundations of current institutions. The dilemma
for minorities created by reasonable accommodation is whether to advance claims
that force majorities to adapt, albeit in modest ways, to the commitments and
practices important to the minority’s identity or to engage in struggles for the
47. Meiorin, supra note 34 at para 42. See also Grismer, supra note 35 at para 19. The ideals
spelled out by Justice McLachlin (as she then was) in these two earlier decisions have been
reiterated by the Court. See Moore v British Columbia (Ministry of Education), 2012 SCC 61
at paras 61-62, 351 DLR (4th) 451.
48. Young offers a discussion of the construction of merit as a social exclusionary value. See Iris
Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990) at 200-06.
49. A more conservative interpretation of reasonable accommodation is also reflected in legal
argumentation that establishes the grounds for accommodation on the basis of comparator
group analysis, which has the effect of entrenching dominant group norms as the standards
against which minority practices are assessed. See Accommodation, supra note 36 at 33-36, fn
104.
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wholesale transformation of existing institutions, which can be more difficult and
less likely to succeed.
Both the identity approach and reasonable accommodation hold out the
promise of being useful in tracing social exclusion and responding to injustice
suffered by minorities. Ideally, both approaches illuminate what it means to treat
individuals as equals, with equal dignity and respect, in full recognition of their
identity-based differences. But, in practice, the approaches carry considerable
risks. One risk is that legal decision makers will apply their own conservative
attitudes—or the conservative norms and values found in the law—thereby
essentializing identities, deepening harmful stereotypes, and entrenching elite
power within minority groups. A second risk is that, within a framework of
accommodation, identity claims can strengthen dominant groups’ norms as the
standards against which minority accommodation is assessed, thereby shielding
dominant practices from serious interrogation. Together, these two risks suggest
that, as a potential site of identity politics, the Charter can be used to perpetuate
cultural domination and elite power rather than advancing the legitimate claims
of minorities for just social change.
To summarize, many of the above-cited studies of the social, political, and
legal processes that underlie the mobilization of groups on the basis of identity show
that the real-world manifestations of identity politics can deepen the vulnerability of
minority groups and subvert the potential of identity approaches to advance just
aims. Unsurprisingly, some of these studies conclude that identity politics and
identity-based claims are too risky in real-world settings to provide an adequate
basis to advance the equal and just treatment of minority groups.50 Despite the
promise of theories of recognition and accommodation to advance democratic
citizenship and human rights, the concern is that these benefits are often lost
when identity claims are translated into legal argumentation, court decisions, and
political decision making. According to this view, political and legal institutions as
well as models of analysis and decision making should be designed to discourage—
rather than encourage or facilitate—identity politics and claims making.
Whereas the risks of identity-based claims are important and serious, the
conclusion that identity politics ought to be suppressed or that institutions should
discourage political and legal claims that are framed in terms of identity is unrealistic
and unwarranted, perhaps especially in relation to Charter adjudication and
50. Whereas this conclusion is implicitly suggested by many studies, Phillips draws it explicitly.
See Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, supra note 5. In relation to the use of the
concept of identity in political analysis, see Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, “Beyond
‘identity’” (2000) 29:1 Theor & Soc 1.
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Canadian politics. Identity politics is, after all, neither a new nor a transient kind
of politics in Canada; rather, it is woven into the very political fabric of the country
and its history of settlement and dispossession, nation building, federalism,
immigration, and religious pluralism.51 Throughout Canadian history, minorities
have mobilized on the basis of religious, linguistic, ethnic, racial, and Indigenous
identity to wage political struggles and to secure protection and resources from
the state. In some cases, groups have enjoyed considerable success.52 But in many
cases their grievances have not been fully resolved, so there is no reason to
suppose that these claims are going away any time soon. The question to ask is
not whether Canadian public institutions should respond to identity claims,
but rather how they can respond to the legitimate grievances that are advanced
through these claims while avoiding some of the problems that can accompany this
kind of politics.
Another reason to resist broad condemnations of identity politics is that such
risks as essentialism, elite manipulation, and co-optation are not unique to identity
politics or to decision making that facilitates identity-based claiming. For
instance, the risk that judges and legislators will deploy narrow and stereotypical
understandings of identities in their decisions is neither a novel nor a more serious
problem today than it was fifty or one hundred years ago when, for example,
policy makers portrayed Indigenous people as child-like, savage, and uncivilized
in order to justify assimilatory policies, or when racist stereotypes were used to
establish a set of “colour-coded” legal precepts.53 Well before a time when identitybased rights were legally recognized and accommodated, public decision makers
51. From debates over the “fragment theories of political culture” to the more recent studies
of Canadian constitutionalism’s “deep diversity,” “reimagined community,” “strange
multiplicity,” “multicultural citizenship,” and “social citizenship,” iconic works about
Canadian law and politics have attempted to grapple with Canada’s identity-based
multiplicity. See e.g. G Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An
Interpretation,” (1966) 32:2 Can J Econ & Pol Sc 143; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship,
supra note 6; Taylor, supra note 6; Tully, supra note 6; Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada:
Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian Constitution (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1994).
52. Studies that document the successful mobilization of groups to advance Charter rights on the
basis of identity claims include Alexandra Dobrowlosky, The Politics of Pragmatism: Women,
Representation and Constitutionalism in Canada (Don Mills: Oxford University Press Canada,
2000); Matt James, Misrecognized Materialists: Social Movements in Canadian Constitutional
Politics (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); Miriam Smith, Lesbian and Gay Rights in Canada:
Social Movements and Equality-Seeking, 1971–1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1999); Vanhala, supra note 18.
53. See e.g. Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada 1900–
1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
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entrenched damaging stereotypes about minorities into Canadian law. Sometimes
they did so with the help of academic and community-based experts who had
their own political and methodological axes to grind.54 Nor is a commitment
by policy makers to ignore cultural or other identity-based differences universally
successful at immunizing public officials against distorting minority identities and
using these distorted views to obscure policies of co-optation and assimilation.55
Indeed, a common criticism of individual rights is that, when stripped of any
attention to group difference, rights can obscure the domination of one group
by another.56
Similarly, courts face challenges about how to use the testimony of elite
experts, such as religious leaders and theologians, or how to assess social scientific
evidence that categorizes people on the basis of class, gender, or interest, in a
whole range of cases in addition to those that are directly about culture, race,
or Indigeneity. From cases about climate change to cigarette advertising, border
disputes to human rights abuses, courts and legislatures can confront elite
opportunism and manipulation, the need to distinguish between legitimate
differences in interests, and the challenge of protecting dissenters. These challenges
are not unique to identity politics but rather are found wherever the strategic
concerns of groups and their leaders are deployed in struggles for political
ends. It should come as no surprise to discover that identity politics attracts
strategic and opportunistic actors as well those who simply attempt to advance
their interests in the most effective ways they can. Indeed, we should expect
this to be true of almost any form of real-world political contestation. The challenges
that are often associated with identity approaches are also problems in a wide
variety of political and legal cases, including ones where policy makers and judges
directly reject giving any consideration to cultural or other features of identity. To
treat these risks as unique to identity approaches can distract us from the broader
problems at issue and mislead us about what constitutes an effective strategy to
respond to these problems.
54. Debates about methodology in the discipline of anthropology have infamously had an
impact on the kind of evidence that anthropologists present in cases about Indigenous legal
claims. See Michael Asch, “The Judicial Conceptualization of Culture after Delgamuukw and
Van der Peet” (2000) 5:2 Rev Const Stud (2000) 119 at 127-29.
55. For example, Trudeau’s 1969 White Paper, which promised to extend equal rights of
citizenship to Aboriginal peoples and in return aimed at eliminating Indigenous entitlements
to land and self-determination, advanced assimilatory ends by denying cultural difference.
Canada, Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969 (Ottawa: Ministry of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1969).
56. See e.g. Young, supra note 48.
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II. TWO WAYS FORWARD: INSTITUTIONAL HUMILITY AND
DEMOCRATIC SPACE
The question that remains is how best to respond to the challenges and risks that
have come to be associated with identity-based claiming and decision-making
approaches. What practices can be developed to minimize and mitigate the
distorting and limiting features of identity-based approaches and accommodation
frameworks? What lessons can be drawn from Canadian experiences that are useful
in steering a course between the risks and benefits of using identity as a means to
protect Charter rights?
One of the most obvious lessons to draw from studies about the protection
of rights in Canada is that institutions make a difference to the mobilization
of identity groups and the interpretation of identity claims. Specifically, the
Charter has a made a difference in expanding the capacities of courts and the
willingness of judges to reflect on the ways in which their decisions advance
ideals of inclusiveness and group-based equality. To take one example, the
Court’s approach to religious freedom has changed over the last thirty years
from one that essentialized religion and openly maintained a “sectarian Christian
ideal,” as Chief Justice Dickson described the Lord’s Day Act in 1985,57 to one
that recognized, as the majority decision in Big M Drug Mart did, that state
support for one religion can undermine equal democratic citizenship and signal
the social exclusion and second-class status of adherents to other religions. Recent
court decisions about freedom of religion have also reflected a strong awareness
amongst the judiciary of the potential risks of essentializing religion and indicate
how courts struggle to avoid legally sanctifying canonical interpretations of a
faith over the individual’s lived understandings of religious commitment;58
nevertheless, judges feel obliged to acknowledge the important connection between
the practices of an individual believer and those of a religious community as
prescribed by its doctrines.59 Even legal scholars who are skeptical that judges are
57. Big M Drug Mart, supra note 13 at para 97.
58. Two recent examples include Multani, supra note 2; and Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004
SCC 47, 2 SCR 551.
59. For example, referring to Amselem, Beaman argues
there is a sense in the judgment that, although the individual’s lived experience and practice is
important, it must link to something that is recognizable as religion, which inevitably involves
the sedimentation of doctrine and a group of people who adhere in one manner or another to
that doctrine through practice.

Lori G Beaman, “Assessing Religious Identity in Law: Sincerity, Accommodation, and Harm”
in Eisenberg & Kymlicka, supra note 1, 238 at 246.
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free to grapple with the normative values of collective identity and group-based
differences within a framework of liberal constitutionalism nevertheless recognize
a tension in some Charter decisions between an interpretative framework that
recognizes the relevance of the collective- and identity-based features of culture
and religion, and one that “collapses the focus back onto conceptions of [individual]
autonomy and choice.”60 This tension suggests that the normative values associated
with identity claims have an impact on the interpretation of Charter rights, even
though this impact is far from uniform, nor are its implications fully developed
in the existing decisions.
Whereas institutions can make a difference, it is often not evident whether
they can resolve tensions between different dimensions of identity or whether
resolving these kinds of tensions is even legally feasible or politically desirable.
Given the kinds of values often at stake in cases involving identity claims, it may
be that courts, although often called upon to assess the validity of identity claims,
are the wrong kinds of institutions to resolve the dilemmas that typically follow
from them. This seems especially apparent in contexts in which the norms of
transparency and accountability are weak, in which members of the judiciary are
heavily drawn from the elites of dominant groups so that their decisions are more
likely to reflect the concerns of these elites or the concerns of dominant publics
who are anxious about the impact of recognizing and accommodating minorities.
For those who take the view that courts are driven by narrow concerns about
protecting their own legitimacy or privilege,61 are unduly influenced by the
political and strategic concerns of legislative elites, or take their direction from
self-seeking interest groups,62 the potential for judges to critically reflect on the
values that ought to guide a normatively defensible assessment of identity claims
will appear unrealizable. But in most democratic contexts, such sweeping and
skeptical views about how courts work are unrealistic. Public institutions are not
so monolithic. They interact with each other and with other organizations and
groups, all of which have different aims and many of which work at cross-purposes
to each other in ways that can have an impact on the direction of political and

60. Berger, supra note 42 at 277.
61. For instance, some legal scholarship argues that institutional legitimacy is a central concern of
the Supreme Court of Canada and a leading influence on the direction of judicial decisions.
See e.g. Vuk Radmilovic, “Strategic Legitimacy Cultivation at the Supreme Court of Canada:
Quebec Secession Reference and Beyond” (2010) 43:4 Can J Pol Sci 843.
62. See in particular FL Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution & the Court Party
(Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2000); Ian Brodie, Friends of the Court: The Privileging
of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).
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legal decision making.63 Forms of identity politics that serve legitimate and
desirable human rights ends can be viewed as a threat to economic projects or
to the electoral objectives of sitting governments. And legal actors, even if they
are drawn from similar social groups, hold a variety of different sympathies and
motives that lead them to pursue different aims in their professions. These
factors alone can make legal decision making unpredictable. At a more principled
level, legal reasoning is open to critical reflection, and judges are obligated by
constitutional principles to reflect on whether the principles they apply treat the
diversity of citizens as equal in real-world contexts. Therefore, the potential exists
for judicial forums to play a creative and leading role in developing principled
guidelines for distinguishing between identity claims that advance core values of
justice and human rights and those that jeopardize these values. Whether this
potential can be realized depends, in part, on whether public decision makers are
willing to counteract the risks of identity politics. When they lack the incentives or,
indeed, work in ways that entrench forms of essentialism and co-optation, identity
politics will be riven with problems. But when institutional actors are subject to
appropriate forms of accountability and transparency, and when minorities may
challenge how their identities are being characterized, the potential exists for
institutional actors to counteract distortions such as essentialism, co-optation,
and social exclusion in order to identify and address legitimate grievances that
identity claims raise.
A. INSTITUTIONAL HUMILITY

To imagine how this might be possible, it is worth considering two frameworks
for thinking about policies that can enhance the capacities of public decision
makers to address legitimate grievances while minimizing the risks of identity
politics.64 The first framework includes policies that engender “institutional
humility,” or the capacity of public institutions to reflect on their own limitations
and develop avenues that can overcome narrow and faulty interpretations of
63. For instance, dialogue approaches map various ways in which courts and legislatures
influence each other despite holding different motivations and aims. See Peter W Hogg
& Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between the Courts and the Legislatures (Or
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall
LJ 75. Pluralists have also traced the trajectory of decision making contexts where courts and
legislatures influence each other while often seeming to work at cross purposes. See Robert A
Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker”
(1957) 6 J Pub L 279.
64. These frameworks are, admittedly, broadly sketched here, are underdeveloped, and are the
subject of my ongoing research.
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principles, rules, and procedures. For example, policies that aim to diversify the
judiciary by recruiting women, Indigenous peoples, and members of underrepresented minority groups into the judicial ranks display institutional humility
insofar as they reflect an attentiveness to the ways in which a diversity of experiences
and circumstances can generate different legitimate perspectives on how the
abstract principles of constitutional and other forms of law translate in practical
terms and diverse contexts. Instead of treating difference as something that can
flourish only in the private domain, recruitment programs that aim to diversify
decision makers establish methods by which the manifestations of difference can
be confronted.65 At the same time, the presence of different voices enhances the
capacity of courts to identify and (one hopes) to avoid entrenching stereotypes or
essentializing minority groups. The aim, as the word “humility” indicates, is to
call attention to the contextual and “on-the-ground” factors that should inform legal
and political decision making if the values protected by abstract rights are going
to be effectively translated into the real-world circumstances in which people lead
their lives.
Institutional humility may also include policies that motivate judges to
adopt disciplined methods to acknowledge the partiality of the law and legal
principles and to reassess legal norms in light of circumstances of known and
yet-to-be-known complexity and diversity while paying special attention to those
who have been excluded and disadvantaged.66 In this regard, institutional
reforms that encourage public decision makers to be open to the limitations
of past decisions, processes, and rules, and to be attentive to the diversity of
experiences and circumstances in which principles apply, can display institutional
humility. Such reforms could, for instance, create opportunities for members of
the public to intervene in constitutional adjudication by presenting briefs that
represent points of view not fully understood or considered by the judiciary.
In the decade following the introduction of the Charter, the Supreme Court
expanded the opportunities for intervenors to present briefs in constitutional
cases and, since that time, the number of cases in which intervenors participate
has steadily grown, with Charter cases attracting the most interventions.67
Intervenors can bring an important measure of transparency and accountability

65. See Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 1-27.
66. In the context of scientific problem solving about complex issues such as climate change,
Sheila Jasanoff identifies the aims of what she calls technologies of humility. “Technologies of
Humility” (2007) 450:7166 Nature 33.
67. Benjamin RD Alarie & Andrew J Green, “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada:
Accuracy, Affiliation, and Acceptance” (2010) 48:3 & 4 Osgoode Hall LJ 381 at 398.
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to otherwise non-participatory processes and their participation can serve as an
effective means by which identity groups can challenge narrow or stereotypical
ways in which their identities are characterized. At the same time, each intervenor
represents only a partial and limited perspective on an issue; therefore the risk is
that intervenors will merely displace one kind of bias for another. In short,
intervenors can engender institutional humility, especially where they enhance the
courts’ understanding of the potential impact of their decisions on a community;
at the same time, their participation in decision making carries risks and can
marginalize points of view relevant to the case at hand. This risk points to the
inevitable partiality of decision making, no matter how expansive and inclusive.
Though institutional humility, as a policy ideal, can create a disposition and an
awareness that allow decision makers to be more open to the complexities of
decision making in diverse societies and to be motivated to address those
complexities fairly, it is not be a panacea for poor decision making.
B. DEMOCRATIC SPACE

Whereas the framework of institutional humility includes policies that create
incentives for courts to develop internal methods of decision making that are more
attentive to the risks of identity-based claiming, the framework of democratic space
includes innovations that look beyond the courts for external means to identify
and respond to legitimate identity claims. Sometimes the best way to avoid the
risks associated with identity-based claiming is to strengthen democratic spaces
where people can contest how their identities are being defined. The framework
of democratic space includes policies that harness the mobilizing power of identity
politics while subjecting identity groups to democratic accountability, transparency,
and inclusiveness. The risks that identity-based claiming will entrench stereotypes,
elite hierarchies, and narrow and distorted understandings of group-based beliefs and
commitments are greatest when people are unable to challenge inherited categories,
canonical interpretations, and elite-inspired scripts about what their identity
consists of. Judges, bureaucrats, and legislators may be less inclined to lend credence
to stereotypes about a group if they are confronted with evidence about the
diverse and pluralistic nature of group values and the hybridity of group members.
A framework of policies that creates democratic space aims at enhancing the
capacities of public institutions to identify circumstances in which mechanisms
of consultation, deliberation, and intra- or inter-community participation can be
useful in providing information about groups and the often contested meaning
of their practices.
In Canada, democratic space of this general sort has been successfully
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created by some commissions of inquiry, including the 2004 Boyd Commission
on religious arbitration in Ontario68 and the 2009 Bouchard–Taylor Commission
on Reasonable Accommodation,69 both of which have been helpful at identifying
identity claims and the risks associated with them. Courts and legislatures can
enhance democratic space by taking special notice of community-based solutions
to disputes that display fidelity to broad and inclusive forms of participation and
thereby strengthen attempts by citizens to sort out conflicts in a manner consistent
with democratic values.70 Democratic space can also be bolstered through initiatives
that require governments to consult communities when legal or political decisions
are likely to affect the community’s organization, practices, and commitments. A
formal legal duty to consult is recognized in relation to government policies and
land-use projects that affect Indigenous communities.71 When land use projects
have proceeded without adequate consultation, courts have found the government
in violation of its procedural obligations and are, in principle, willing to rescind
approval for these projects.72
Much like identity politics itself, efforts by courts to enhance democratic
spaces can lead to other challenges, not least of which is the need to establish
criteria for what counts as meaningful consultation. Similarly, if courts are going
to have a role in enhancing democratic spaces and processes, they need guidelines
for what constitutes legitimate democratic space. These guidelines are especially
important where the parties to a dispute have unequal power, causing one party
to be less effective at advancing its interests. The likelihood that such inequalities
will characterize most democratic spaces points to one of the risks of addressing
68. Boyd, supra note 2.
69. Building the Future, supra note 2.
70. See e.g. Regina (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100.
Here, the House of Lords endorsed the decision of the Governors of Denbigh High School
to restrict a female student, Sabina Begum, from wearing a veil, known as a jilbab, to school
instead of the school uniform. The Court noted that the school’s dress code, which allowed
some kinds of veils but not the jilbab, was developed after broad consultation with parents,
students, staff, and the Imams of the three local mosques. Also see Anver M Emon, “Islamic
Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence, and Multicultural Accommodation”
(2008) 87 Can Bar Rev 391 at 422-25. Anver Emon shows how legal recognition could
have enhanced democratic dialogue in relation to disputes about religious arbitration. Emon
argues that legal recognition of religious arbitration could be structured to create multiple
Muslim family service organizations with competing visions of Islamic law some or all of
which have incentives to enter into dialogue with the state. His vision is, in these respects,
consistent with a vision of how policies create democratic space.
71. See Sheppard, supra note 37.
72. See Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at
paras 57, 68, 3 SCR 388.
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identity claims using an approach that rests solely on resolving conflicts through
democratic mechanisms—namely that democratic solutions will favour dominant
interests and can marginalize minorities. And yet this risk is much greater where
no democratic space exists for minorities to contest identity claims. In short,
democratic space may be necessary, even if it is not a sufficient condition for
responding to identity claims fairly and in ways that can best advance their
normative value while mitigating some of the risks that accompany them.

III. CONCLUSION
Legal and political scholars, within and outside Canada, have pointed to the
rights entrenched in Canada’s Charter to illustrate how the recognition of
identity can be deployed in the service of justice. Some of the Charter’s provisions
are sensitive to identity. These provisions have the potential to help courts address
structural injustice and to track discrimination against women, gay and lesbian
individuals, individuals with disabilities, Indigenous peoples, as well as linguistic,
cultural, and religious minorities. The hope that follows from an optimistic view
is that the constitutional recognition of identity categories will mobilize groups
to advance claims for the recognition and protection of their identity and
motivate courts and other public institutions to develop capacities to reflect on
these claims in a transparent and accountable manner. In this way, the hope is
that Charter rights can become effective in advancing Canada’s commitment to
the values embodied in human rights in the age of diversity.
And yet, we can see that, in real-world settings, identity-based claiming is
often accompanied by serious risks such as the risk that group identities will be
essentialized and stereotyped, that elite power will become entrenched through
decisions that legally validate patriarchal or other inegalitarian cultural and
religious practices, and that efforts to accommodate minorities will end up
offering only modest and tokenistic kinds of recognition and protection that,
paradoxically, strengthen dominant group norms. In the real world, identitybased claims cannot be divorced from these and other features of the strategic
politics of identity. Whereas identity claims are grounded in normative values
that can be helpful in advancing equality, human rights, democratic citizenship,
and respect for minority groups, it is not possible to divorce the strategic from
the normative features of this form of politics—or, for that matter, of any form
of politics. Instead, public institutions have to develop capacities to mitigate the
risks and maximize the benefits of identity, as well as other forms of politics—
which is, after all, what they ought to be designed to do.

